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I. Introduction
Although the first child is free, any person who becomes the biological
parent of a second nonmarital child within the state of Mississippi is guilty of a
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misdemeanor punishable by a $250.00 fine and up to ninety days imprisonment.1
Indeed, until the state amended its “crimes against public morals and decency”
in 2004, Mississippi required its state health department to report the names and
addresses of every person “listed on birth certificates of illegitimate children” to
every district attorney in the state.2 In Tennessee, county officials may indenture
nonmarital children into servitude if it “satisfactorily” appears their mother
“disregards their moral and mental culture, and either keeps or lives in a house
of ill fame.”3 So long as it seems it would better the child’s condition, Tennessee
counties can “bind out illegitimate children,” as apprentices even if the mother
otherwise provides her children with sufficient clothing and food.4
Notwithstanding these rather extreme exceptions, modern statutory
schemes generally disfavor laws that create legal distinctions based on the marital
status of a person’s parents, especially laws that deny rights to nonmarital children
or perpetuate the stigma associated with the legal status of “illegitimacy.”5 This
sentiment, however, represents a substantial evolution in social views that effected
changes to important areas of law.6 Although Wyoming law reflects some of the
legislative trends related to the rights of nonmarital children, the state’s laws of
intestate succession continue to distinguish between marital and nonmarital
children.7 Wyoming Statute § 2-4-102, entitled “Rule of descent; illegitimate
person,” provides the “rule of descent of all property, real and personal, of
any illegitimate person dying intestate” in Wyoming.8 Under this provision,

1
See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-11 (2018) (“If any person, who shall have previously
become the natural parent of an illegitimate child . . . , shall again become the natural parent of
an illegitimate child born within this state, he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”). Each
subsequent child born out-of-wedlock to a person in Mississippi could result in a fine of $500.00
and up to six months in jail. Id.
2
Act of April 22, 2004, ch. 399, 2004 Miss. Laws 259 (codified as amended at Miss. Code
Ann. § 97-29-11 (2018)).
3
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-3-302 (2018) (illegitimate children as apprentices) (“The
county legislative body may bind out illegitimate children in the same way as orphans, upon its
satisfactorily appearing that the . . . condition of such children would be thereby bettered, although
the mother may provide ordinary food and clothing for the mother’s children.”).

See id. To “bind out” means to indenture or legally obligate to serve. Bind, Black’s Law
Dictionary (5th Pocket ed. 2016).
4

5
See infra notes 88–104, 205–23 and accompanying text. The examples of exceptions
provided in the first paragraph represent the extreme. See also Karen A. Hauser, Comment,
Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children: New Science Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny Add Up to
The Need for Change, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 891, 901– 02 (1997) (“Birth inside of marriage or outside
of marriage is a matter of status.”).
6

See infra notes 16 –104 and accompanying text.

7

See infra notes 8–9, 108–223 and accompanying text.

8

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-102 (2018).
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nonmarital children are categorically precluded from distributing property to
their fathers through intestate succession, even after the father establishes paternity
by judicial determination.9
Part II of this Comment begins with a brief history of the treatment of
nonmarital children in state intestacy laws and in Wyoming’s rules of intestate
descent.10 Part II follows with an overview of United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence concerning discrimination against nonmarital children in state
inheritance laws.11 Part II concludes with an examination of how most state
legislatures have responded to these Supreme Court decisions by eliminating
statutory distinctions between marital and nonmarital children, including the
stigmatizing classification of “illegitimacy.”12 Finally, Part III challenges the
propriety of Wyoming Statute § 2-4-102 in light of surrounding provisions,
equal protection concerns, and current social models.13 Although Wyoming has
eliminated the legal distinction from most of its statutes, the Wyoming State
Legislature finds itself decades behind legislative and societal trends with respect to
its laws of intestate succession.14 Accordingly, Part III argues that Wyoming should
repeal § 2-4-102, which continues to label nonmarital children as “illegitimate,”
both in title and in substance.15

II. Background
Historically, the law has not been kind to nonmarital children.16 Unequal
treatment of children born out-of-wedlock frequently afforded nonmarital
children fewer rights than children born to married parents.17 Common law
once precluded children born out-of-wedlock from paternal child support, social

9

See id.; infra notes 168–80 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 16–38 and accompanying text (providing a brief historical survey of early
state intestacy laws, including a lengthier discussion of Wyoming’s rules specifically).
10

11

See infra notes 39–87 accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 88–107 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 108–224 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 27–38 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 108 –224 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.

Unif. Parentage Act § 202 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); see also 16 Richard R.
Powell, Powell on Real Property § 90.08[3][a] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2018); Solangel
Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63
Fla. L. Rev. 345, 346 – 47 (2011) (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 (1977)); Susan E.
Satava, Comment, Discrimination Against the Unacknowledged Illegitimate Child and the Wrongful
Death Statute, 25 Cap. U.L. Rev. 933, 933–35 (1996).
17
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security benefits, and recovery for wrongful death.18 Furthermore, state laws
created the legal status of “illegitimacy,” which perpetuated the stigma that
nonmarital children were disfavored members of society.19 Among the most
pervasive effects of the legal distinctions imposed on nonmarital children,
however, was the impact on inheritance and property distribution at death.20

A. Nonmarital Children and Intestate Succession
Early common law classified children born out-of-wedlock as filius nullius, or
“the child of no one,” and many state statutes considered them “nonpersons”.21
With this legal status, a person who was born out-of-wedlock could not inherit
from anyone but that person’s spouse.22 Beginning in 1785, however, states began
enacting laws that afforded nonmarital children more of the same rights enjoyed
by marital children than they had under the common law.23 Kentucky, Vermont,
and Virginia were among the first states to pass laws that permitted children
born out-of-wedlock to take from their mothers through intestate succession.24
Throughout the nineteenth century, many new states and territories followed this
trend.25 Likewise, a number of states enacted laws that established at least some

18
Maldonado, supra note 17, at 346 – 47, 350–51; see also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S.
628 (1974) (social security benefits); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (child support); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death).
19
See Maldonado, supra note 17, at 346 – 48, 350–51; 16 Powell, supra note 17, § 90.08
[3] n.29.
20
See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 (1977); Maldonado, supra note 17,
at 357–60, 364– 67; Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980: An Analysis
and Critique, 16 Land & Water L. Rev. 103, 109–33 (1981) [hereinafter Averill, The Wyoming
Probate Code of 1980 ]; Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates, Guardianship
and Trusts: A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code—Part I, 7 Land & Water L. Rev. 169,
183– 85 (1972) [hereinafter Averill, Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates]; infra notes 21–38, 51 and
accompanying text.
21
16 Powell, supra note 17, § 90.08[3][a]; Maldonado, supra note 17, at 350 (citing Trimble,
430 U.S. at 768); Satava, supra note 17, at 934, 937. “I proceed next to the rights and incapacities
which appertain to a bastard. The rights are very few, being only such as he can acquire; for he
can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody; and sometimes called filius nullius
. . . .” Filius nullius, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (quoting 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *447 (1765)); see also Levy, 391 U.S. at 70; infra notes 48– 49 and accompanying text.
22

16 Powell, supra note 17, § 90.08[3][a]; Maldonado, supra note 17, at 350.

23

See 16 Powell, supra note 17, § 90.08[3][a] nn.34 –46.

See id. § 90.08[3][a]. Without the aid of a specific statute, Connecticut reached the same
result when its courts construed the word “children” in the state’s intestacy laws to include the
nonmarital child of a female decedent. Id. (citing Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228 (1824); Brown v.
Dye, 2 Root 280 (Conn. 1795)).
24

25

See id.
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means for a child born to unwed parents to inherit from their fathers through
intestate succession, if the child’s parents later married.26

1. Early Intestate Succession Laws in Wyoming
In 1869, before Wyoming became a state, the territory’s first legislative
assembly enacted its original rules governing property distribution through
intestate succession.27 Consistent with other territories and states, Wyoming’s prestatehood intestate distribution rules distinguished between decedents based on
the marital status of their parents.28 Although the original act allowed a child born
out-of-wedlock to inherit from the mother, a nonmarital child was permitted to
inherit from the father only if the mother and father married each other after
the birth of the child.29 In addition, the act provided the rule of descent for all
real and personal property “of any bastard or illegitimate person” dying intestate
in Wyoming.30 This rule, now codified at § 2-4-102, is distinct from the rule of
descent for all “other persons” and precludes fathers from taking property through
intestate succession from their nonmarital children.31

2. Wyoming’s Archaic Rules of Intestate Descent
Although Wyoming’s intestacy statutes predate its statehood, Wyoming’s
rules of descent for intestate succession have remained substantially unchanged.32
Despite the enactment of two comprehensive probate acts and one major revision,
the basic pattern of intestate distribution remains unaltered.33 After Wyoming
became a state, its first state legislature passed the Probate Procedure Act, which

See id. “Legitimation” is the act or process of declaring a nonmarital child legitimate,
especially by the later marriage of the child’s parents. Legitimation, Black’s Law Dictionary,
supra note 21 (“From the time of Constantine, the rule of Roman law was that children born
before marriage were made legitimate by the subsequent marriage of their parents.” (quoting G.C.
Cheshire, Private International Law 427–28 (6th ed. 1961))).
26

Act of Dec. 10, 1869, ch. 41, 1869 Wyo. Sess. Laws 398 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-4-101 to 2-4-108 (2018)) (regulating intestate descent and
distribution of property); Averill, Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates, supra note 20, at 172 (“This
act covered nearly the full range of intestacy questions including the rights of all full blooded next
of kin, half bloods, illegitimates, posthumous children, aliens, children receiving advancements, and
children whose parents are divorced.”).
27

See Averill, Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates, supra note 20, at 172; see also Wyo. Stat.
Ann. §§ 2-4-101 to -102; infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
28

29

Act of December 10, 1869, ch. 41, § 7, 1869 Wyo. Sess. Laws 398, 400 (repealed 1979).

30

Id. § 10, at 400– 01 (codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-102 (2018)).

31

See id.; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-4-101, -102; infra notes 117–29 and accompanying text.

Averill, Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates, supra note 20, at 172 (“Other than a minor
amendment in 1877 and a little more significant one in 1915, the basic distribution provisions have
remained unchanged.”).
32

33

See id.
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governed the administration of decedents’ estates until 1979, when Wyoming’s
legislature adopted the Wyoming Probate Code.34 The following year, the
Wyoming Legislature substantially revised the Probate Code to address practitioner
concerns with the new provisions.35 However, despite these sweeping changes to
Wyoming’s probate laws, the state’s rules of intestate descent and the language of
§ 2-4-102 survived each major revision.36 With each revision, the Legislature
simply renumbered Wyoming’s original rules of descent and incorporated them
into each new version of the Wyoming Probate Code without amending the
language or substance of the original provisions.37 Consequently, Wyoming courts
have been applying the same rules of intestate succession for nearly 150 years.38

B. Nonmarital Children and Equal Protection
In the late 1960s, the United States Supreme Court began addressing the
constitutionality of state laws that denied children born out-of-wedlock certain
rights otherwise afforded to marital children.39 During this period, the Court
invalidated a series of state statutes that distinguished between marital and
nonmarital children for the purposes of determining legal heirship, beneficiaries,
and the right to recover.40 In each line of cases, the Court upheld its position
that statutory discrimination against nonmarital children violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 As the Court decided these
34

See id. at 172–73.

Probate Code, ch. 142, 1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws 256 (1979) (codified as amended at Wyo.
Stat. Ann. §§ 2-1-101 to 2-15-106 (2018)); Probate Code of 1980, ch. 54, 1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws
267 (codified as amended at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-1-101 to 2-15-106 (2018)). The development
of the Probate Code of 1980 served as the “last general review and recodification of probate law in
Wyoming” by the Legislature to date. Ann Bradford Stevens, Uniform Probate Code Procedures: Time
for Wyoming to Reconsider, 2 Wyo. L. Rev. 293, 294 –95 (2002). For more information about the
history of Wyoming’s probate laws generally, see Averill, Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates, supra
note 20, at 171–74; Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 20, at 103, 109–33.
35

36
Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 20, at 106–07, 106 n.8, 109; see also
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-102 (2018); supra notes 29–35 and accompanying text.
37
See, e.g., Probate Code, ch. 142, 1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws 256; Probate Code of 1980, ch. 54,
1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws 267.
38

See supra notes 7–9, 27–37 and accompanying text.

39

See infra notes 40, 47–87 and accompanying text.

Unif. Parentage Act § 202 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); Maldonado, supra note 17,
at 351–52; see also, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (intestate succession); Jimenez
v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (social security benefits); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619 (1973) (public assistance); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (right to child
support); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (worker’s compensation);
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (public assistance); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(wrongful death).
40

See supra notes 39– 40 and accompanying text. “No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also infra
notes 47– 87 and accompanying text.
41
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cases, it clarified the level of scrutiny required for birth status discrimination
claims, which evolved from a rational basis test in Levy v. Louisiana to the “not
toothless,” intermediate level of scrutiny that controlled in Lalli v. Lalli.42 The
following three cases illustrate not only the Court’s analysis of equal protection
questions concerning nonmarital children, but also the particular impact each
holding had in shaping modern intestacy laws.43
Many of the Court’s birth status cases assessed the constitutionality of laws
that denied children born out-of-wedlock the right to inherit property from their
biological fathers who died intestate.44 In contrast, Wyoming Statute § 2-4-102
concerns the rights of nonmarital children to distribute property to their biological
fathers through intestate succession.45 Although the Court has yet to consider
whether its holdings extend to rights of nonmarital children to freely distribute
property at death, the Court’s analysis of similar statutory distinctions provides
some guidance as to how Wyoming courts might address an equal protection
challenge to § 2-4-102.46

1. Levy v. Louisiana
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court decided Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968), which served as a catalyst for a flood of challenges to state
laws that distinguished between marital and nonmarital children.47 In Levy, the
Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a Louisiana statute that denied
children born out-of-wedlock the right to recover for the wrongful death of a
parent.48 After their mother’s death, a representative brought the case on behalf of
five nonmarital children to challenge a Louisiana statute that classified nonmarital
children as “nonpersons” for purposes of determining the right to recover for
wrongful death.49 The Court emphasized the limits on state power to create legal
classifications between particular groups of people, noting that although “a State
has broad power when it comes to making classifications, it may not draw a line

42

See infra notes 47– 87, 144 –53 and accompanying text.

43

See infra notes 47– 87 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble, 430 U.S. 762; Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971).
44

45

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-102 (2018); infra notes 108–43 and accompanying text.

46

See infra notes 47– 87, 144–204 and accompanying text.

47

See supra notes 39– 40 and accompanying text.

See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Nonmarital children were not considered
“persons” for the purpose of determining the right to recover under the state’s wrongful death
statute. Id. at 70.
48

49

See id. at 69 –70.
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which constitutes an invidious discrimination against a particular class.”50 The
Court explained its extreme sensitivity for basic civil rights and cautioned that it
would not hesitate to “strike down an invidious classification even though it had
history and tradition on its side.”51
Applying a rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of the
line drawn between marital and nonmarital children, the Court looked to the
State’s purported purpose for the statutory distinction.52 Louisiana’s rationale for
denying nonmarital children the right to recover for wrongful death was “based
on morals and general welfare because it discourage[d] bringing children into
the world out of wedlock.”53 In the context of equal protection, the Court questioned why rights should be denied to nonmarital children based solely on their
birth to unwed parents.54 Finding no rational reason for the distinction between
marital and nonmarital children regarding the right to recover for wrongful death,
the Court concluded that “it is invidious to discriminate against them when
no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that
was done” to their loved one.55 The Court found the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause and invalidated the law.56

2. Trimble v. Gordon
Several years later, in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), the Court
invalidated a section of the Illinois Probate Act that precluded children born
50
See id. at 71 (citations omitted) (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541– 42 (1942)). Invidious discrimination is “[a]ny distinction
drawn in a population for inappropriate reasons [or] the creation or perpetuation of a burden on one
individual or group, particularly if the motivation for the creation of that burden is ill-will toward
the individual or group or a desire to harm one for the benefit of another.” Invidious discrimination,
The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary (Desk ed. 2012).
51
Levy, 391 U.S. at 71 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, (1954); Harper v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)). The Court began its analysis with the premise that
nonmarital children are “nonpersons” under the statute, concluding that they “are humans, live, and
have their being. They are clearly ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.

See id. at 70 –72. “Though the test has been variously stated, the end result is whether the
line drawn is a rational one.” Id. (citing Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465–66 (1957)); supra notes
42, 48 and accompanying text.
52

53

Levy, 391 U.S. at 70 (citing Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1966)).

Id. at 71. One of the determinative factors considered by the Court was the fact that the
law imposes the same responsibilities on all citizens—including the registration for the draft and the
payment of taxes—without regard to the marital status of their parents. Id.
54

Id. at 72 (“Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong
allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she
cared for them and nurtured them . . . ; in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that any
dependent would.”).
55

56

See id. at 71–72.
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out-of-wedlock from inheriting from their fathers through intestate succession.57
Because the statute permitted nonmarital children to inherit only from their
mothers, but allowed marital children to inherit from both parents, the Court
held that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court held the statutory discrimination
against nonmarital children in the context of intestate succession unconstitutional, reversing Illinois’s decision to uphold the statute.59 In reaching this
conclusion, the majority found the Illinois Supreme Court failed to complete the
constitutional analysis because it did not address the relation between the State’s
alleged purpose and intestate distribution.60
As with Levy, a significant portion of the Court’s reasoning in Trimble rested
on the State’s purpose and its interest in distinguishing between marital and
nonmarital children in the context of intestate succession.61 The Court first
considered Illinois’s purported interest in promoting “legitimate” family
relationships.62 Without challenging the State’s concern for protecting the family
unit as a fundamental social institution, the Court examined the relationship
between the purpose and the statute.63 Based on its prior decisions expressly
rejecting “the argument that a State may attempt to influence the actions
of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their
illegitimate relationships,” the Court found that a State does not reach its goal
by imposing a total statutory disinheritance on nonmarital children.64 As such,
the Court ultimately held that the distinction between marital and nonmarital
children in the statute did not bear a substantial relationship to the State’s
purported purpose.65

57

See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).

58

Id. at 763, 776.

See id. at 765–67 (defining the level of scrutiny required for equal protection challenges
involving nonmarital children).
59

60
Id. at 769. The constitutionality of this state law “depends upon the character of the
discrimination and its relation to legitimate legislative aims.” Id. (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 504 (1976)).
61

See id. at 767–73; supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.

62

See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 768 –70.

See id. at 769 (“In a case like this, the Equal Protection Clause requires more than the mere
incantation of a proper state purpose . . . . The court below did not address the relation between
[the statute] and the promotion of legitimate family relationships, thus leaving the constitutional
analysis incomplete.”).
63

Id. at 769. The Court reasoned, “parents have the ability to conform their conduct to
societal norms, but their illegitimate children can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own
status.” Id. at 770 (“Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate
child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”).
64

65

Trimble, 430 U.S. at 769.
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The Court next discussed the state’s interest in orderly disposition of property
at death.66 The lower court placed significant emphasis on the evidentiary
challenges associated with proof of paternity and related concerns about
spurious claims to decedents’ estates.67 In response, the Court iterated its duty
to “accord substantial deference to a State’s statutory scheme of inheritance” and
the difficulty of “vindicating constitutional rights without interfering unduly
with the State’s primary responsibility” in governing the orderly disposition of
a decedent’s property.68 Regarding the evidentiary concerns posed by proof of
paternity, the Court enounced the need for the proper balance in the context
of equal protection.69 The Court noted that evidentiary concerns should not be
brushed aside lightly, but they also cannot justify “an impenetrable barrier that
works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination” and arbitrary line drawing to
avoid potential problems with proof.70
With respect to the second state interest, the Court concluded that the
potential challenges in proving paternity do not create a sufficient justification
“for the total statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers die
intestate.”71 Consequently, the Court held that the “reach of the statute extends
well beyond the asserted purposes” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it invalidated the statute on the basis that it
categorically denied nonmarital children the right to inherit from their fathers.72

66

See id. at 770 –72.

Id. at 770 (explaining that the “more favorable treatment of illegitimate children claiming
from their mothers’ estates was justified because ‘proof of a lineal relationship is more readily ascertainable when dealing with maternal ancestors’” (quoting In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234,
52 (Ill. 1975))). At the time of the Supreme Court’s decision in Trimble, genetic testing as a reliable
means of proving paternity was not readily available and would not be for another several decades.
See Hauser, supra note 5, at 946 –51; infra note 164 and accompanying text.
67

68
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771. The Court elaborated on the need for an appropriate legal
framework for the orderly disposition of property at death, leaving the specific structure within
the discretion of each individual state. Id. “In exercising this responsibility, a State necessarily must
enact laws governing both the procedure and substance of intestate succession.” Id. With respect
to constitutional challenges, the Court explained the substantial deference they should accord to a
state’s inheritance rules when constitutional violations are alleged. Id.
69

See id. at 771.

70

Id. at 771 (quoting Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973)).

71

Id. at 772.

See id. at 772–74 (citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974)). The Court
summarized its reasoning as follows: “Traditional equal protection analysis asks whether this
statutory differentiation on the basis of illegitimacy is justified by the promotion of recognized state
objectives. If the law cannot be sustained on this analysis, it is not clear how it can be saved by the
absence of an insurmountable barrier to inheritance under other and hypothetical circumstances.”
Id. at 773 –74.
72

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol19/iss1/6

10

Learned: Illegitimate Succession: Vestigial Discrimination in Wyoming’s Ru

2019

Comment

129

3. Lalli v. Lalli
Finally, in Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), the Court clarified its holding
in Trimble by upholding a New York statute that precluded children born out-ofwedlock from inheriting from their fathers through intestate succession without
formal proof of paternity.73 The Court in Lalli distinguished the evidentiary
requirement in the New York statute from the categorical preclusion prescribed
by the Illinois statute invalidated in Trimble, holding that “the orderly settlement
of estates [and] the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy
laws” were important state interests and the requirement to establish paternity was
not overburdensome.74
The Court addressed whether the “discrete procedural demands that [the
New York intestacy statute] places on illegitimate children bear an evident and
substantial relation to the particular state interests this statute is designed to serve.”75
The Court again noted it has long recognized the considerable magnitude of a
state’s interest in the just and orderly disposition of property at death.76 The Court
also reiterated its position regarding evidentiary concerns, stating these concerns
are “directly implicated in paternal inheritance by illegitimate children because of
the peculiar problems of proof that are involved.”77
The Court in Lalli distinguished Trimble on two separate grounds.78 First,
by requiring a nonmarital child’s “legitimation” through the intermarriage of the
child’s biological parents as an absolute precondition to inheritance—in addition
to the father’s acknowledgment of paternity—the Illinois statute eliminated “the
possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and
case-by-case determination of paternity.”79 The statute in Trimble imposed a total
73
See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). The statute at issue required that the proof of
paternity be established during the purported father’s lifetime. Id. at 261– 62. Upholding this
requirement, the Court explained, “[a]ccuracy is enhanced by placing paternity disputes in a judicial
forum during the lifetime of the father.” Id. at 271.
74

Id at. 266 (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771).

Id. at 268. In contrast, the issue in Trimble was whether Illinois’s purported interests in
promoting traditional family structures and avoiding potential evidentiary issues regarding proof
of paternity justified the total preclusion from paternal inheritance for nonmarital children. See
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771–72; supra notes 57–72 and accompanying text.
75

Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268 (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305
U.S. 188, 193 (1938)); see also supra notes 66 – 68 and accompanying text.
76

Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268. As the Court noted, it is seldomly difficult to establish maternity. Id.
“Proof of paternity, by contrast, frequently is difficult when the father is not part of a formal family
unit.” Id. at 269; see also supra note 67.
77

78

See id. at 264– 65; infra notes 79– 85 and accompanying text.

Lalli, 439 U.S. at 266 – 67 (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770 –71). “[E]ven a judicial
declaration of paternity was insufficient to permit inheritance” under the Illinois statute in
Trimble. Id.
79
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disinheritance of nonmarital children unless they were subsequently legitimated
by their parents’ marriage, making the law unconstitutional.80 In contrast, the
requirement of establishing paternity for the purpose of intestate succession did
not inevitably result in the unnecessary disqualification of a substantial number
of nonmarital children who were capable of proving the existence of the fatherchild relationship.81
Secondly, the Court in Lalli reasoned that the Illinois statute had been at least
partially defended as a means of promoting marital family relationships.82 New
York, however, did not offer the same justification in support of the statutory
distinction.83 With respect to the evidentiary requirement in the New York
statute, the Court ultimately held that the “administration of an estate [would]
be facilitated, and the possibility of delay and uncertainty minimized, where the
entitlement of an illegitimate child to notice and participation is a matter of
judicial record before the administration commences.”84 Accordingly, the Court
found that the reach of the statute fell within the asserted purpose.85
Concerning fraudulent assertions of paternity, the Court found spurious
claims would be “much less likely to succeed, or even to arise, where the proof
is put before a court of law at a time when the putative father is available to
respond, rather than first brought to light when the distribution of the assets
of an estate” is soon to occur.86 The Court ultimately upheld the New York
evidentiary requirement for proof of paternity on the basis that it reflected
the proper balance between important state interests and the charge to grant
nonmarital children the same inheritance rights as marital children, in so far as
is practicable.87

C. Nonmarital Children and State Parentage Laws
Following the series of United States Supreme Court decisions striking down
laws that discriminated against nonmarital children, states responded by revising
their laws accordingly.88 Shortly after the Court’s decision in Levy, the Uniform

80

See id. at 273.

81

See id.

82

See id. at 267 (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 768).

83

See id.

84

Id. at 271.

85

See id.

86

Id. at 271–72.

Id. at 274; see also supra notes 75– 85 and accompanying text; infra notes 98–104 and
accompanying text.
87

See 16 Powell, supra note 17, § 90.08[3][b]; Hauser, supra note 5, at 950–53; supra notes
39–87 and accompanying text.
88
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Law Commission (Commission) promulgated the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)
to specifically address inequities for nonmarital children in conformity with the
new constitutional guidelines.89 In support of its approach, the Commission
emphasized the need for new state legislation on the issue of parentage, explaining
that “the bulk of current law on the subject of children born out of wedlock is
either unconstitutional or subject to grave constitutional doubt.”90 For legislative
guidance in complying with evolving case law, many states embraced the UPA,
which catalyzed the trend toward the elimination of birth status classifications
from state law.91
The Commission developed the UPA to accomplish two primary goals:
provide a reliable legal framework for establishing paternity and eliminate
statutory classification based on birth status as a benchmark for a person’s legal
rights.92 Contributors sought not only to ensure nonmarital children enjoy the
same rights as children born to married parents, but also to permanently eliminate
the concept of “illegitimacy” and any remaining vestige of the stigma perpetuated
by the discriminatory legal status.93 As one means of mitigating inequitable
treatment of nonmarital children, the UPA’s substantive and procedural framework
operates to ensure the parent-child relationship “is established solely on the basis
of parentage and not on the basis of the parents’ marital status.”94 As the Court
noted in Trimble and Lalli, states can sufficiently satisfy their interest in orderly
and accurate disposition of property through their freedom to prescribe any
regularized procedure or formal method of proof that will assure the authenticity
of an acknowledgment of paternity.95 To assist states in accomplishing this goal,

89
See Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); Paula Monopoli,
Toward Equality: Nonmarital Children and the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. Mich. J.L. Reform
995, 1003 (2012); Hauser, supra note 5, at 917.
90
Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (Unif. Law Comm’n 1973); see also supra notes
40–88 and accompanying text.
91
See Monopoli, supra note 89, at 1003; Hauser, supra note 5, at 917; supra notes 39–87 and
accompanying text.
92
Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017) (citing Unif. Parentage
Act § 2, cmt. (1973)); Unif. Parentage Act § 202 (“A parent-child relationship extends equally
to every child and parent, regardless of the marital status of the parent.”). The comment to
§ 202 states, the “provision reaffirms the principle that once a parent-child relationship has been
established, that relationship is entitled to substantive equality, regardless of whether the child is
a marital or a nonmarital child.” Unif. Parentage Act § 202 cmt.; see also Averill, The Wyoming
Probate Code of 1980, supra note 20, at 111–12; Satava, supra note 17, at 933–35.

Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017) (citing Unif. Parentage
Act § 2, cmt. (1973)).
93

94
Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 20, at 111–12; Unif. Parentage
Act, prefatory note (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); see also Hauser, supra note 5, at 917, 939.
95

Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 272 n.8 (1978).
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the UPA substantively defines the parent-child relationship and then sets forth the
procedural guidelines for establishing the parent-child relationship with respect to
nonmarital children.96
Several states, including Wyoming, have adopted some form of the UPA
from at least one of the three available versions.97 Although the degree of the
evidentiary requirements differs among states, the various statutory amendments were intended to ensure nonmarital children have the same legal rights as
children with married parents.98 To that end, the Commission later revised the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) to incorporate by reference the UPA’s evidentiary
framework for establishing paternity for the purposes of determining legal heirship
for intestate succession.99 The incorporation of the UPA into the UPC served as
a final solution in the search for requirements “designed to ensure the accurate
resolution of claims of paternity and to minimize the potential for disruption of
estate administration.”100
As the second means of mitigating inequitable treatment of nonmarital
children through the UPA, the Commission sought to fully eliminate the
stigmatizing legal status of “illegitimacy” from state statutes in accordance with
changing social family models and marital trends.101 The original version of
the UPA eliminated the use of the term “illegitimate” entirely and replaced it
with the phrase “child with no presumed father.”102 The second version uses the
terms “nonmarital” and “born out-of-wedlock” interchangeably, and the most
96

Unif. Parentage Act (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); Hauser, supra note 5, at 917.

Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017) (citing Legislative Fact
Sheet – Parentage Act (2017), Uniform Law Commission, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act%20(2017)); see also Legislative Fact Sheet – Parentage
Act (2002), Uniform Law Commission, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=
Parentage%20Act%20(2002) (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); Legislative Fact Sheet – Parentage Act (1973),
Uniform Law Commission, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20
Act%20(1973) (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
97

See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 274 (“[T]he New York Legislature desired to ‘grant to illegitimates in
so far as practicable rights of inheritance on a par with those enjoyed by legitimate children . . . .’”);
Unif. Parentage Act § 2 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family?
Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 Idaho L. Rev.
353, 375–76 (1988); supra note 94 and accompanying text.
98

99
Monopoli, supra note 89, at 1002–03, 1003 n.55 (citing Unif. Probate Code § 2-115,
legislative note (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 51 (Supp. 2011)); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-107
(2018) (“A person born out of wedlock is a child of . . . the father, if the relationship of parent
and child has been established under the Uniform Parentage Act . . . .”); infra notes 132–36 and
accompanying text. For information regarding states adopting the UPA and UPC, see Hauser, supra
note 5, at 952–59.
100

See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 269–71.

See Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (Unif. Law Comm’n 2002) (citing Unif.
Parentage Act (Unif. Law Comm’n 1973)); supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
101

Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (Unif. Law Comm’n 1973); see also, e.g., Unif.
Parentage Act §§ 6(c), 7 (Unif. Law Comm’n 1973).
102
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recent version uses the term “nonmarital” exclusively.103 Many states took similar
measures to eliminate the use of the term “illegitimate” from their statutes after
adopting the UPA.104
As evidenced by Wyoming Statute § 2-4-102, entitled “Rule of descent;
illegitimate person,” Wyoming is not among the majority of states that have taken
formal action to entirely eliminate the term “illegitimate” and the related legal
distinction from its laws, notwithstanding the state’s enactment of the Wyoming
Uniform Parentage Act.105 The problem in Wyoming, however, extends beyond
the use of the stigmatizing language of “illegitimacy” in reference to nonmarital
children.106 As a result of the Wyoming Legislature’s continued failure to revise the
state’s original laws of intestate succession, § 2-4-102 continues to treat nonmarital
and marital children differently for the purpose of intestate distribution on the
basis of their birth status.107

III. Analysis
Wyoming’s laws of intestate succession provide default rules for the
distribution of real and personal property for decedents who die without a will
in the state.108 For the purposes of intestate distribution, Wyoming’s intestacy
laws classify decedents based on the marital status of the decedent’s parents, providing a separate rule of descent for nonmarital children.109 Although § 2-4-101
provides the general rule of descent in Wyoming, § 2-4-102 governs the rule of
descent for “any illegitimate person dying intestate in this state.”110
Despite initial similarities between the two intestate provisions, the
Wyoming rules of descent apply differently to a decedent if that person has no

103
See, e.g., Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note, art. 4 cmt., § 601 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n
2002); see generally Unif. Parentage Act (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017).
104
See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law § 56 (McKinney 1925); Terms Describing Parents,
Children, and Siblings Act, ch. 1046, 1994 Iowa Acts 87, 87 (replacing each and every occurrence
of the word “illegitimate” in the Iowa Code with the word “biological.”). But see supra notes 1–4
and accompanying text.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-102 (2018); id. § 14-2-401 to -907; Lovas, supra note 98, at
375–76; supra notes 89–104; infra notes 130 –42 and accompanying text.
105

106

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-102; infra notes 108–224 and accompanying text.

107

See infra notes 108 –223 and accompanying text.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-4-101 to -108; Jesse Dukeminier & Robert H. Sitkoff, Wills,
Trusts, and Estates 63 – 67 (10th ed. 2017).
108

109
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-4-101, -102; Averill, Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates, supra
note 20, at 182–85.
110

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-4-101, -102.
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surviving spouse or descendants and was born out-of-wedlock.111 Under these
circumstances, the decedent’s property passes to the decedent’s “mother and
her children” pursuant to § 2-4-102(a)(iii).112 In contrast, under § 2-4-101, the
estate of a person who dies with no surviving spouse or children passes to the
decedent’s “mother, father, brothers and sisters,” if that person was born to parents
who were married.113 By allowing the property of a decedent born out-of-wedlock
to pass only to that person’s mother and her descendants, § 2-4-102 categorically
precludes nonmarital children from distributing property to their father and his
descendants through intestate succession.114

A. Section 2-4-102 is Inconsistent with Surrounding Statutes
The interpretation of a revision to an entire area of law warrants consideration
of the effects an alteration to one provision can have on the interpretation given to
an otherwise unaltered provision.115 With respect to § 2-4-102, certain legislative
amendments to surrounding sections of Wyoming’s laws of intestate succession
have gone beyond merely affecting the given interpretation, causing § 2-4-102 to
become entirely unnecessary and inconsistent with Wyoming’s laws of intestate
succession as a whole.116

1. Wyoming Statute § 2-4-101
Wyoming Statute § 2-4-101 provides the general rule of descent for purposes
of determining intestate succession in Wyoming.117 This provision provides
the pattern of distribution to be applied when a decedent dies without a will:
“Whenever any person having title to any real or personal property having the
nature or legal character of real estate or personal estate undisposed of . . . dies
intestate, the estate shall descend and be distributed in parcenary to his kindred,
See id. § 2-4-102(a)(i)–(iv). “If the deceased illegitimate person leaves no heirs, as above
provided, the estate shall pass to and vest in the next of kin of the mother of such illegitimate person,
in the same manner as the estate of a legitimate person would pass by law to the next of kin.” Id.
§ 2-4-102(a)(iv).
111

112
Id. § 2-4-102(a)(iii) (“If the deceased illegitimate person leaves no widow, surviving
husband or descendents, his estate shall descend to and vest in the mother and her children, and
their descendents, one-half (½) to the mother and the other half to be equally divided between her
children and their descendents.”); supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101(c)(ii) (emphasis added) (“If there are no children, nor their
descendents, then to his father, mother, brothers and sisters, and to the descendents of brothers and
sisters who are dead, the descendents collectively taking the share which their parents would have
taken if living, in equal parts . . . .”).
113

114
See id. § 2-4-102; Averill, Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates, supra note 20, at 183–85;
supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
115

Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 20, at 105.

116

See infra notes 118–42 and accompanying text.

117

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101.
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male and female. . . .”118 Unlike § 2-4-102, which has never been amended,
§ 2-4-101 has seen at least thirteen minor amendments since it was enacted
in 1869.119
As the emphasis above indicates, the language in § 2-4-101 applies to “any
person.”120 Neither the excerpted nor the remaining language of the statute make
any reference to the purported exception provided in § 2-4-102.121 Indeed, the
provision is void of any language commonly employed in Wyoming statutes to
indicate the existence of another provision that may affect the interpretation
regarding the statute’s applicability.122 Based on common phrases found in other
Wyoming statutes, a practitioner may expect to see phrases such as, “subject to
the limitations provided in subsequent provisions . . . ” or “notwithstanding
the rules provided by § 2-4-102 . . . .”123 Section 2-4-101, however, contains no
such language.124
In Levy v. Louisiana, the Court asserted that children born out-of-wedlock
are “clearly persons” within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.125 Applying this reasoning, nonmarital children are
clearly “persons” within the meaning of § 2-4-101.126 Furthermore, no case law or
other authority offers an alternative interpretation.127 Because § 2-4-101 governs
the rule of intestate descent for “any person,” the distinction provided by § 2-4102 based on the marital status of a decedent’s parents conflicts with § 2-4-101.128
Under principles of statutory interpretation, this incongruity poses a challenge to

118

Id. § 2-4-101(a) (emphasis added).

See, e.g., Probate Code, ch. 142, 1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws 256 (1979) (codified as amended at
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-1-101 to 2-15-106 (2018)); Probate Code of 1980, ch. 54, 1980 Wyo. Sess.
Laws 267 (codified as amended at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-1-101 to 2-15-106 (2018)). These minor
changes to § 2-4-102 were not substantive and did not affect the underlying pattern of distribution.
See supra notes 32–38 and accompanying text.
119

120

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-101(a).

121

See id.

122

See id.; infra note 123 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-11-105 (2018) (“Subject to the limitation in subsection
(a) of this section, the resident, his estate and other legally responsible persons are liable after release
of the resident for the payment of any unpaid established charge.”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-7-301
(2018) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, a house trailer shall not
be removed pursuant to this section if it is occupied by the lessee.”).
123

124

See id. § 2-4-101(a).

125

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).

126

See supra notes 52–56, 125 and accompanying text.

127

See supra notes 188 and accompanying text.

128

See supra notes 108–27 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

17

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 1, Art. 6

136

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

practitioners because it creates uncertainty as to the operation of § 2-4-102 and
whether it remains the controlling rule for intestate distribution for a Wyoming
decedent who was born out-of-wedlock.129

2. Wyoming Statute § 2-4-107
Section 2-4-107 provides Wyoming’s rules for determining the parent-child
relationship for purposes of intestate succession.130 As amended, this provision
further eliminates the need for § 2-4-102 and the distinction it creates between
decedents.131 Shortly after adopting the Wyoming UPA in 1977, the Wyoming
Legislature incorporated the UPA by reference into § 2-4-107 with the enactment
of the Wyoming Probate Code of 1979.132 As outlined above, the UPA provides a
judicial and evidentiary framework for establishing a person’s parentage and was
intended to ensure certain rights and obligations between parents and children are
based on parentage and not on the marital status of the parents.133
With respect to the determination of the parent-child relationship for
nonmarital children, § 2-4-107 provides in relevant part, “[a] person born out
of wedlock is a child of the mother. That person is also a child of the father, if the
relationship of parent and child has been established under the Uniform Parentage
Act.”134 The incorporation of the UPA into § 2-4-107 extends the framework
for establishing the parent-child relationship to any person dying intestate,
without regard to the marital status of the decedent’s parents.135 Because the UPA
adequately addresses the evidentiary concerns commonly associated with proof of
paternity, the incorporation of the UPA eliminates the need to impose separate
rules of intestate descent for nonmarital children as dictated by § 2-4-102.136

129

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-107.

130

Id.

131

See supra notes 115–29 and accompanying text.

See Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 20, at 111. The Wyoming
Uniform Parentage Act was originally enacted as Wyoming Statutes §§ 14-2-101 through
14-2-120. Id. at 111 n.20; see also Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 174
(1977). That version of the Act was repealed in 2003 and an amended version was codified in
scattered sections of Wyoming Statutes §§ 14-2-401 through 14-2-907. See Wyoming Uniform
Parentage Act, 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 93 (codified as amended at scattered sections of Wyo. Stat.
Ann. §§ 14-2-401 to 14-2-907 (2018)).
132

133
Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); see Averill, The Wyoming
Probate Code of 1980, supra note 20, at 111–12; see also supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text.
134

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-107 (emphasis added).

135

See id.; supra notes 88–107, 130–34 and accompanying text.

See Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 20, at 111–12 (citing Wyo.
Stat. § 14-2-104(c) (1977 Repub. Ed.)).
136
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3. Wyoming Statute § 14-2-502
In addition to reflecting the UPA’s broader purpose of establishing the
evidentiary framework for proof of paternity, Wyoming’s version of the UPA
includes a provision that expressly precludes statutory discrimination based on
marital status.137 Aptly entitled “No discrimination based on marital status,”
Wyoming Statute § 14-2-502 provides that a “child born to parents who are not
married to each other has the same rights under the law as a child born to parents
who are married to each other.”138 This section is among the UPA provisions
incorporated by reference into Wyoming’s laws of intestate succession.139
Accordingly, the language in § 14-2-502 suggests that nonmarital children
should be afforded the same right to distribute property to their fathers and
his descendants as children born to parents who are married to each other.140
The imposition of separate rules of descent provided by §§ 2-4-101 and -102,
however, conflicts significantly with this interpretation.141 Because § 2-4-102
operates to categorically preclude nonmarital children from distributing property
to their fathers through intestate succession, the provision directly contradicts
§ 14-2-502’s prohibition on this type of legal distinction.142 Despite the apparent
conflict, both provisions appear to remain fully operable according to Wyoming’s
statutory interpretation principles.143

B. Section 2-4-102 is Inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause
The Wyoming Supreme Court has yet to evaluate the constitutionality of
§ 2-4-102.144 Nevertheless, based on the United States Supreme Court cases
invalidating state statutes that discriminate against children based on the marital
status of their parents, the distinction between marital and nonmarital children
created by § 2-4-102 implicates equal protection concerns.145 However, because
§ 2-4-102 limits the rights of children born out-of-wedlock to distribute
property through intestate succession, rather than their right to receive property,
the proper analysis of Wyoming’s rules of descent under Trimble and Lalli remains

137

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-502 (2018).

138

Id.

139

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-107.

140

See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.

141

See infra notes 144–204 and accompanying text.

142

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-502; infra notes 144–204 and accompanying text.

See Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 20, at 105; In re Estate of Fosler,
13 P.3d 686, 688– 89 (Wyo. 2000); infra notes 144, 188 and accompanying text
143

144

See infra notes 145– 47 and accompanying text.

See Lovas, supra note 98, at 376, 376 n.162; supra notes 39–87 and accompanying text;
infra notes 148–204 and accompanying text.
145
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unclear.146 Although the statutory distinction concerns the right of nonmarital
children to distribute property to—rather than receive property from—their
fathers, it is possible to examine Wyoming’s rules of descent under the Court’s
reasoning in Trimble and Lalli.147

1. Discrimination Based on Marital Status of Parents
The Court’s constitutional analysis of the statute in Trimble considered “the
character of the discrimination and the relation to legitimate legislative aims.”148
Although classifications based on parent’s marital status are not subject to strict
scrutiny, the validity of the statutory distinction under the Equal Protection Clause
depends on whether the difference in treatment bears a substantial relation to
important state interests.149 Although the law permits all children to inherit from
both their mother and father, with respect to intestate distribution, Wyoming laws
of intestate succession apply differently to decedents born out-of-wedlock than to
decedents born to parents who were married.150 This difference in treatment may
serve as a basis for an equal protection challenge under Justice Powell’s “less than
strict, but not toothless” level of intermediate scrutiny as outlined Trimble.151

2. Substantial Relation to Important State Purpose
When Wyoming’s then-territorial legislature passed § 2-4-102, it failed
to document any specific purpose for imposing a separate rule of descent for
nonmarital children, and the Wyoming Legislature has subsequently declined to
justify the vestigial distinction.152 The United States Supreme Court, however,

146
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to directly address the question of
whether its holdings in Trimble and Lalli would extend to other testamentary contexts, some courts
and scholars have contemplated other, related applications. See, e.g., Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9
(7th Cir. 1975) (probable intent for intestate distribution); Monopoli, supra note 89 (class gifts
in donative documents); supra notes 57– 87 and accompanying text; infra notes 148–204 and
accompanying text.
147

See infra notes 148–204 and accompanying text.

Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) (“In a case like this, the Equal Protection
Clause requires more than the mere incantation of a proper state purpose.” (quoting Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976))); see also supra note 105–07 and accompanying text.
148

Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 699, 810 (Wolter
Kluwer, ed. 2015); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (citing Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506 (1976);
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767)); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
149

150

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-102 (2018); see also supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.

See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767 (“Despite the conclusion that classifications based on
illegitimacy fall in a ‘realm of less than strictest scrutiny,’ [this] scrutiny ‘is not a toothless one . . . .’”
(quoting Mathews, 427 U.S. at 510)); Monopoli, supra note 89, at 1021–22; infra notes 152–204
and accompanying text.
151

See supra notes 27–38 and accompanying text. Despite several minor updates to sur
roundings statutes over the years, Wyoming has never substantively amended §2-4-102.
152
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discussed a number of state purposes in Trimble and Lalli to determine whether
each was substantially related to the distinction between marital and nonmarital
children.153 The purported state purposes discussed by the Court are among
the common purposes asserted to justify laws that treat nonmarital children
differently.154 As such, the Court’s reasoning in these cases could be informative in
an equal protection analysis of § 2-4-102.155

a. Promoting Legitimate Family Relationships
The Trimble Court quickly disposed of the government’s first purported
purpose for the statute, reaffirming its position that the encouragement of
legitimate family relationships does not bear a substantial relation to the legal
classification which denies certain rights to nonmarital children.156 Given the
evolution of social mores since Trimble, it is unlikely that Wyoming would offer
a similar justification for imposing a separate rule of descent on nonmarital
children in support of § 2-4-102.157 Moreover, after the Court reiterated this
reasoning in Lalli, any state’s attempt to challenge the Court’s well-settled
position in the future is unlikely to be effective.158 As such, the Wyoming Supreme
Court would have a solid basis for invalidating § 2-4-102 on equal protection
grounds, absent some other state purpose bearing a substantial relation to the
disparate treatment.159

In Trimble, Illinois proposed two state interests: fostering “the encouragement of
legitimate family relationships” and maintaining “an accurate and efficient method of disposing
of an intestate decedent’s property.” Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265 (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 768). The
issue in Lalli was “whether the discrete procedural demands that [the New York statute] places on
illegitimate children bear an evident and substantial relation to the particular state interests this
statute is designed to serve.” Id. at 268.
153

See, e.g., Mathews, 427 U.S. 495 (discussing the state’s interest in promoting legitimate
family relationships and concerns about proving paternity, fraud, and error); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
154

155

See infra notes 156 –204 and accompanying text.

Trimble, 430 U.S. at 769 (“[W]e have expressly considered and rejected the argument
that a State may attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on
the children born of their illegitimate relationships.” (citing Weber, 406 U.S. at 173, 175)). The
Court reasoned that visiting “society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds
of marriage . . . on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.” Id.; see also supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
156

See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 273 (“Granting that the State was appropriately concerned with the
integrity of the family unit, we viewed the statute as bearing ‘only the most attenuated relationship
to the asserted goal.’” (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771)).
157

158
See also supra note 156 and accompanying text. The State in Lalli did not offer this
justification, but the Court discussed it in distinguishing the statute at issue in Trimble. Lalli, 439
U.S. at 268 (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771).
159

See supra notes 144–58 and accompanying text; infra 160–85 and accompanying text.
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b. Orderly Distribution of Property at Death
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized states’ considerable
interest in maintaining just and orderly disposition of property at death, especially
for the significant number of people who die without a will.160 Central to that
purpose is a state’s underlying interest in protecting against spurious claims to
testators’ estates.161 Much of the concern for fraudulent or mistaken claims in
the context of intestate succession arises out of the challenges associated with
proving the legal and genetic relationships that determine legal heirship for
intestate succession.162 With respect to nonmarital children, the relationship at
issue in § 2-4-102 and the above-discussed cases is one of parentage.163
When the Court decided Trimble, genetic testing was not an available
tool for establishing paternity and few states had adopted the legal framework
created under the UPA.164 Because proof of the maternal relationship was more
readily ascertainable, the Trimble Court found “more serious problems of proving
paternity might justify a more demanding standard” for establishing a fatherchild relationship for a person born out-of-wedlock.165 Although a state’s interest
in accurate and orderly property disposition is substantial, the Court held that
the reach of the Illinois statute far exceeded its justifiable purposes.166 As
an absolute precondition to inheritance from the father, the Illinois statute
required “the legitimation of the child through the intermarriage of the parents.”167
Indeed, not even a judicial adjudication of paternity could allow inheritance
under the statute.168 Similarly, because § 2-4-102 simply omits the father and his
decedents from the line of intestate descent for children born out-of-wedlock,
establishment of the father-child relationship in accordance with § 2-4-107 and

Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268 (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771; Weber, 406 U.S. at 170; Labine
v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193 (1938)). About 56% of
Americans die without a will. Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not Have a Will, Gallup (May
18, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx.
160

161
Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268 (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771; Weber, 406 U.S. at 170; Labine,
401 U.S. at 538; Lyeth, 305 U.S. at 193); see also infra notes 164– 84 and accompanying text.
162
Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268 (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771; Weber, 406 U.S. at 170; Labine,
401 U.S. at 538; Lyeth, 305 U.S. at 193); see also infra notes 164–84 and accompanying text.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-4-101, -102, -107 (2018); see supra notes 88–143 and accompa
nying text.
163

164

See generally Hauser, supra note 5, at 946 –51.

Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770 –71 (quoting In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234, 240 (Ill.
1975)); see also Labine, 401 U.S. 532.
165

166

Lalli, 439 U.S. at 273; see also id. at 271.

167

Id. at 266– 67 (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770–71).

168

Id.
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the Wyoming UPA has no effect on whether the child will distribute property
to the nonmarital father through intestate succession under the language of
the statute.169
The problem with this approach in Trimble was the unnecessary categorical
bar to significant categories of nonmarital children who could establish the
father-child relationship “without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates
or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws.”170 Judicial
procedures for establishing paternity sufficiently serve the states’ interest, and
states are free to evaluate the merits of the various forms of proof.171 Difficulty
proving paternity in limited situations, however, is not a significant justification
for birth status classifications that effect a total statutory exclusion of nonmarital children from rights otherwise enjoyed by marital children.172 Because
Wyoming’s intestacy laws provide a legal framework for establishing paternity
under the UPA, the constitutionality of the status-based classification created by
§ 2-4-102 is questionable under the Court’s reasoning in Trimble.173
In contrast, the right to inherit in Lalli was not based on the legal status as
a child of wed or unwed parents; indeed, all children had the right to inherit
from both parents.174 The distinction for a nonmarital child in the New York
statute arose from the requirement for proof to establish the legal father-child
relationship.175 Accordingly, only the failure to prove paternity would result in a
bar to paternal inheritance to a nonmarital child.176 Because this requirement does
not inevitably result in the unnecessary disqualification of a significant number

Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-107 (2018); see also supra notes 108–42
and accompanying text.
169

170
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771; Lalli, 439 U.S. at 266–67 (“This combination of requirements
eliminated ‘the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and
case-by-case determination of paternity.’” Id. (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770–71)).
171

See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772, 773 n.14; Lalli, 439 U.S. at 272 n.8.

172

See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771.

See Estate of Stern, 311 S.E.2d 909, 911–12 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), aff ’d per curiam,
322 S.E.2d 771 (N.C. 1984) (“Though the classification in the present case differs from those
in Trimble [and Lalli ] . . . ; nevertheless, we shall apply the intermediate standard of review
rather than the lower standard of review because it is at least arguable that the classification
here is one ‘based on illegitimacy.’”); David E. Webb, The Prodigal Father: Intestate Succession of
Illegitimate Children in North Carolina Under Section 29-19, 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1274, 1285 (1985)
(“Stern establishes for North Carolina the modest proposition that the same equal protection and
statutory analysis is applicable . . . whether the plaintiff is an illegitimate child or the heir of an
illegitimate child’s father.”); see also Estate of Hicks, 675 N.E.2d 89, 97 (Ill. 1996) (applying
the Court’s analysis in Trimble to invalidate a statute that categorically precluded fathers from
inheriting from their nonmarital children through intestate succession).
173

174

Lalli, 439 U.S. at 267.

175

Id.

176

Id. at 273.
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of nonmarital children, such a legal framework is generally permissible.177 Indeed,
the proof-of-paternity requirement works to improve accuracy in property
disposition, while a total statutory preclusion extends far beyond that purpose.178
With respect to the freedom of distribution, Wyoming Statute § 2-4-102
functions more like the statute in Trimble because it operates as a total statutory
bar, preventing all nonmarital children in Wyoming from distributing property
to their fathers through intestate succession.179 Likewise, nonmarital children in
Wyoming also cannot overcome the statutory preclusion, even after establishing
the father-child relationship through the state’s legal framework for judicially
acknowledged paternity.180 However, in the context of orderly disposition at
death, the Court finds no difficulty of proof or opportunity for inaccurate or
spurious claims where the father has formally established paternity by adjudication
or through any state authorized procedure.181 Moreover, scientific advancements
in and increased access to genetic testing further “eliminate the public policy
justification for continued discrimination against extramarital children in the
area of inheritance rights.”182 As such, this state interest offers no justification for
the distinction between marital children and formally acknowledged nonmarital
children imposed by § 2-4-102.183 Because the law also applies to nonmarital
children who do not need to be included for the state to serve its purpose, the
provision likely fails intermediate scrutiny as to this purpose.184

3. Presumed Testamentary Intent
The freedom of disposition afforded to donors is an organizing principle
of American succession laws, which aim to facilitate the posthumous
implementation of a decedent’s donative intent.185 The primary concern of the
law of succession is “enabling posthumous enforcement of the actual intent of
the decedent or, failing this, giving effect to the decedent’s probable intent.”186

177

Id.; see also supra notes 73– 87 and accompanying text.

Lalli, 439 U.S. at 273 (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771); see also id. at 271 (finding that
placing paternity disputes in a judicial forum actually enhances accuracy); supra notes 50–72 and
accompanying text.
178

179

See supra notes 102–29 and accompanying text.

180

See supra notes 79, 179 and accompanying text.

181

See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 553 (1971).

182

Hauser, supra note 5, at 892; see supra notes 67, 164 and accompanying text.

183

Id.

See Chemerinsky, supra note 149, at 702 (“A law is overinclusive if it applies to those who
need not be included in order for the government to achieve its purpose.”); see also supra notes
148–51 and accompanying text.
184

185

See Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 1.

186

Id. (emphasis added); see also infra notes 187–204 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol19/iss1/6

24

Learned: Illegitimate Succession: Vestigial Discrimination in Wyoming’s Ru

2019

Comment

143

In accordance with the notion of freedom of disposition, an underlying
purpose of a state’s default rules of intestate descent represent a typical testator’s
probable intent.187
Because the Wyoming Supreme Court has yet to interpret § 2-4-102 or discuss
its merits, Wyoming’s purported purpose for imposing a separate rule of descent
on nonmarital children remains unclear.188 Although it was not until 2000, the
court has discussed the legislative purpose of Wyoming’s intestacy laws generally
when it first interpreted the language of the rule of descent for marital children
provided in § 2-4-101.189 The court stated, in “drafting intestate laws, legislatures
have tried . . . to provide for a scheme of distribution that would likely coincide
with the desires of the average man who owns an average size estate composed of
ordinary property to be distributed among a usual number and kind of relatives
. . . .”190 To the extent the legislature intended § 2-4-102 to coincide with the
desires of the average nonmarital child, the question arises whether a categorical
bar to intestate distribution by children born out-of-wedlock to nonmarital
fathers bears a substantial relation to that purpose.191
In its discussion of the asserted state interest served by the Illinois statute,
the Trimble Court briefly remarked about whether a state can justify disparate
treatment of nonmarital children on the basis of presumed intent of decedents
alone.192 However, after concluding that the “statutory provisions at issue
were shaped by forces other than the desire of the legislature to mirror the
intentions of the citizens of the State with respect to their illegitimate children,” the majority chose not to address the question in its evaluation of the
Illinois statute.193 Although the Trimble Court declined to address the question
187
Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 65 (“In accordance with the principle of
freedom of disposition, the primary objective in designing an intestacy statute is to carry out
the probable intent of the typical intestate decedent.”); Averill, Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates,
supra note 20, at 176 (“The general intent of intestacy laws is to distribute a person’s wealth on
his death in a pattern which represents a close facsimile to that which the person would have
designed had he properly manifested his intent.”).
188
Only one Wyoming case mentions the statute, but the provision was not at issue in the
case. See In re Estate of Scherer, 2014 WY 129, ¶¶ 15–17, 336 P.3d 129, 134–35 (Wyo. 2014);
supra note 144 and accompanying text. To determine a legislative intent that is reasonable and
consistent, “the court must look to the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical
setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other
prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of construction . . . .” In re Estate of Fosler, 13 P.3d 686, 688 (Wyo. 2000) (citing State ex rel. Motor Vehicle
Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983)).
189

See Fosler, 13 P.3d 686.

Id. at 689–90 (citing 1 William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, Page on the Law
Wills § 1.6 (1960)); Averill, Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates, supra note 20, at 176).
190

191

See supra note 168 and accompanying text.

192

Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775 (1977).

193

Id.
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directly, some authorities suggest presumed intent would also fail as a justification for the limitation on intestate distribution imposed on nonmarital children
by § 2-4-102.194

a. Substantial Relation to an Important State Purpose
Although courts afford states broad latitude to determine the probable intent
of testators under the default rules of intestacy, a state’s discretion is not without
limits.195 However, as noted above, state statutory classifications that distinguish
based on the marital status of a decedent’s parents warrant “stricter” scrutiny to
ensure the law does not unnecessarily deny significant categories of nonmarital
children rights it otherwise affords marital children.196
Wyoming Statute § 2-4-101 allows marital children to distribute property
to both of their parents through intestate succession, while § 2-4-102 precludes
children born out-of-wedlock from distributing property to their biological father
and his descendants.197 Under current notions of presumed testamentary intent, it
is unreasonable to presume that nonmarital children in Wyoming are “unanimous
in their sentiment” to disinherit their father and paternal half siblings.198 While
some testators who were born out-of-wedlock may choose to distribute property
only to their mothers and disinherit their biological fathers, “the obligation to
afford all persons equal protection of the laws arises” when the decision is made by
the state.199

194

See infra note 201 and accompanying text.

Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767. The Court explained that structuring the appropriate procedural and substantive framework of intestate succession is “particularly within the competence of
the individual States.” Id. at 771 (“Absent infringement of a constitutional right, the federal courts
have no role here, and, even when constitutional violations are alleged, those courts should accord
substantial deference to a State’s statutory scheme of inheritance.”); see also Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174 (1972).
195

196
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767 (“Though the latitude given state economic and social regula
tion is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental
personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny. . . .”).
197

See supra notes 108–36 and accompanying text.

See Estate of Dulles, 431 A.2d 208, 214 (Pa. 1981) (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 775
n.16) (rejecting the argument that the theory of presumed intent under Pennsylvania’s laws of
intestacy justified the exclusion of nonmarital grandchildren from a class gift to “grandchildren” in
testamentary instruments). “Even if one assumed that a majority of the citizens of the State preferred
to discriminate against their illegitimate children, the sentiment hardly would be unanimous.”
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 775 n.16 (“At least when the disadvantaged group has been a frequent
target of discrimination, as illegitimates have, we doubt that a State constitutionally may place the
burden on that group by invoking the theory of “presumed intent.” (citing Eskra v. Morton, 524
F.2d 9, 12–14 (7th Cir. 1975))). See also Monopoli, supra note 89, at 1024–27; infra notes 205–24
and accompanying text.
198

199

Eskra, 524 F.2d at 14.
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With two separate classes of testators for determining intestate distribution,
Wyoming’s intestacy laws presume a different probable intent for marital children
than they presume for nonmarital children.200 In the context of § 2-4-102,
Wyoming law presumes the probable intent of marital children would be to
include their fathers in the distribution of property, but presumes the probable
intent of nonmarital children would be to exclude their fathers and any paternal
siblings.201 Accordingly, the State could argue that § 2-4-102 of Wyoming’s
intestate succession laws seeks to carry out a general intent of nonmarital children
to exclude their fathers from the distribution of their property at death.202 However,
by denying nonmarital children the freedom to distribute property to their
biological fathers through intestate succession, § 2-4-102 imposes a limitation on
the freedom of disposition on nonmarital children that is not similarly imposed
on marital children.203 The existence of these equal protection concerns evidences
the Wyoming Legislature’s need to consider the constitutional validity of § 2-4102 and whether any state purpose is served by its continued operation. However,
even if probable intent does not serve as a sufficient basis to sustain an equal
protection claim against the provision, the presumption and inconsistency with
surrounding sections provide strong policy arguments in support of the repeal of
§ 2-4-102 by the Legislature.204

C. Section 2-4-102 is Inconsistent with Current Legislative and
Societal Trends
Section 2-4-102 also conflicts with current social models and changing
family and marital trends.205 As increasingly more couples decide to start families
but choose not to marry, most state legislatures have responded by eliminating
the stigmatizing language of “illegitimacy” and related distinctions from their
statutes.206 Although Wyoming has eliminated this stigmatizing language
from most of its statutes, the Wyoming Legislature has yet to respond to the
legislative and societal trends with respect to its laws of intestate succession.207
The Legislature’s failure to update Wyoming’s 150 year-old rules of descent

200

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 554 (1971) (“Intestate succession laws might
seek to carry out a general intent of parents, not to provide for publicly acknowledged illegitimate children.”).
201

202

See id.

203

See supra notes 194–202 and accompanying text.

204

See infra notes 205–22 and accompanying text.

205

See infra notes 206 –24 and accompanying text.

See Douglas E. Abrams et al., Contemporary Family Law 1–2, 4 (4th ed. 2015);
Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 74–75; infra notes 209–14 and accompanying text.
206

207

See supra notes 32–38 and accompanying text.
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since their enactment by the territory evidences the need for a reevaluation of the
state’s intestacy provisions and the policies on which they are based.208
According to the research of social scientists, “nothing short of a revolution
has occurred in family life.”209 From 1960 to 2011, the number of couples
choosing to cohabitate without marrying rose by more than 1,700%.210 Between
1960 and 2013, the number of married adult men and women shifted from
approximately two-thirds of the population to a point where less than half of
households were occupied by married couples.211 Between 2000 and 2010,
the number of cohabitating unmarried couples increased by 41.1%, while the
total population only increased 9.71%.212 Conversely, the number of married
households grew by only 3.7% during this period.213 The 2010 data also revealed
that, of the 6.6% of unmarried couple households, “39 percent of unmarried
opposite couple households, and 17 percent of same-sex couple households,
included children.”214 This rapid shift in the current social and family models
and recent United States Supreme Court decisions indicate these trends will
likely continue to evolve into the future.215 This shift from predominately marital
families to “functional” or “nontraditional” families has particular import for the
functioning of intestacy laws.216
Through its failure to update the state’s intestacy laws and its failure to repeal
its rule of descent for “illegitimate persons,” Wyoming perpetuates the vestigial

Hauser, supra note 5, at 892; see also Lovas, supra note 98, at 376; supra notes 50–72,
144–204 and accompanying text.
208

209
Abrams et al., supra note 206, at 1 (quoting Suzanne M. Bianchi, Family Change and Time
Allocation in American Families, 638 Annals 21, 21 (2011)).
210

Abrams

et al.,

supra note 206, at 4; see also Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 108, at

Abrams

et al.,

supra note 206, at 4; see also Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 108, at

74–75.
211

74–75.
212

Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 74; see also Abrams

et al.,

supra note 206, at

1–2, 4.
Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 74 –75 (noting that the 2010 census data show
opposite-sex partners make up 90% of unmarried couple households); see also Abrams et al., supra
note 206, at 1–2, 4.
213

214

Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 74; see also Abrams

et al.,

supra note 206, at

1–2, 4.
Abrams et al., supra note 206, at 1; see also, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015) (finding that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment afford same-sex couples a fundamental right to marry; invalidating state laws excluding
same-sex couples from civil marriage; and holding that states do not have the right to refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage on the ground of its same-sex character when it was performed
in another state).
215

See Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 74 –75; see also Abrams
206, at 1–4.
216
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stigma that nonmarital children are disfavored members of society.217 Essentially,
§ 2-4-102 continues to classify each nonmarital child as a “non-child” of the
father, indicating that genetic testing and judicially established paternity are not
sufficient for recognition of the parent-child relationship under the statute.218
In conflict with the above-discussed principles of the UPA, the provision still
classifies nonmarital children as “illegitimate.”219 Especially under current social
constructs, the term continues to carry a powerfully negative connotation as a
label for children who were born to unwed parents.220 For example, the dictionary
definitions for “illegitimate” include “improper,” “invalid,” and “against the law/
unlawful.”221 In contrast, dictionaries define “legitimate” as “valid,” “genuine,”
and “complying with the law/lawful.”222 With respect to children, the label can
also mean “unintended” or “unwanted.”223 The term “illegitimacy” is shrouded
with the notion of deviancy and is not an acceptable legal status for states to
impose on nonmarital children.224

IV. Conclusion
Giving the words of Wyoming Statute § 2-4-102 their plain meaning, as
we must, it appears the Wyoming Legislature intends to send the message that
nonmarital children are disfavored by society.225 However, according to some
Wyoming practioners and district court judges, there is a greater likelihood that
this statute has simply been overlooked by Wyoming courts and legislators.226
To the extent Wyoming fails to update state law in conformity with the civil
rights decisions of the United State Supreme Court, the continued effectiveness of
§ 2-4-102 calls in to question whether the Wyoming Legislature has any duty to

217
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http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=illegitimate+child (last visited Jan. 3,
2010); Virginia Heffernan, Street Smart: Urban Dictionary, N.Y. Times, July 1, 2009, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/07/05/magazine/05FOB-medium-t.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2018)).
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periodically review state laws and evaluate their utility and validity.227 Accordingly,
the Wyoming Legislature should carefully review its state laws, repeal § 2-4-102
and any other discriminatory provisions, leaving behind only the fittest under
modern statutory schemes and current social mores.228
AUTHOR’S NOTE: At the time of publication, the Wyoming
Legislature was considering a bill to repeal Wyoming Statute
§ 2-4-102. Inspired by this Comment, House Bill No.
HB0269, “Illegitimate persons descent-repeal” was proposed
by Representative Charles “The Bastard” Pelkey (D), with
Representatives Landon Brown (R), Cathy Connolly (D), Jared
Olsen (R), Dan Zwonitzer (R), and Senator Tara Nethercott (R)
joining as co-sponsors. In addition to the repeal of § 2-4-102,
the proposed bill calls for a conforming amendment eliminating
language from Wyoming Statute § 2-1-301 that expressly
excluded nonmarital children from the definition of “child”
for the purpose of the Wyoming Probate Code. House Bill 269
was introduced in the Wyoming House of Representatives on
January 28, 2019. Following unanimous approval by the House
Judiciary Committee, it passed 58-2 in the Wyoming House of
Representatives on February 5, 2019 and was introduced in the
Wyoming Senate the following day. A draft of the bill is available
at https://wyoleg.gov/Legislation/2019/HB0269.
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Hauser, supra note 5, at 892; Lovas, supra note 98, at 375–76, 376 n.162; see supra note
208 and accompanying text.
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